Singapore and Brunei may appear odd since the Constitutions considered were not those that were drafted exactly at the point of independence. Brunei became independent from Britain only in 1984 but the Constitution being studied is that of 1959 which was an earlier effort to edge the absolute monarchy towards greater democracy. In the case of Singapore, it became independent twice, first from Great Britain in 1963 as a constituent State of the Federation of Malaysia, and then again in 1965 when it seceded from the Federation as a unitary State. Thailand, the only Southeast Asian State never to have been colonised is ' represented ' here by the contested versions of its 1932 Constitution which ostensibly transformed Siam into a constitutional monarchy.
This book is the outcome of an interdisciplinary project. While it draws on constitutional scholarship to understand the process and substance of constitution-making, it integrates knowledge in cognate disciplines, particularly historical studies and political science to better understand the process of constitution-making and the relationship between constitutions and statebuilding. Consequently, contributors of the book include both constitutional law scholars and historians. For each country, we asked contributors to offer three things. First, to provide an exploratory description of the process and substances in making the fi rst modern Constitution in the respective country. Questions posed, and hopefully answered include: How was the constitutionmaking body formulated ? Who were in that body ? How was the Constitution drafted ? What were the constitutional questions that the drafters considered ? How were these questions debated in the constitution-making body and among the public ? How was the Constitution approved ? Second, contributors were asked to provide an explanatory analysis of the internal and external factors surrounding the making of the Constitution. What are the internal factors (eg, political-legal tradition, colonialism, revolution, social-economic condition, political confl icts, social division, ideology, local intellectual environment) which infl uenced the making of this Constitution ? What are the external factors (for example foreign constitutional experiences and constitutional ideas, international bodies, or international experts) ? What are the interactions between the internal and external factors ? Third, we asked contributors to offer some refl ections on the role of the fi rst constitutional document in the founding of the modern nation-state and the subsequent state-building process in the country. How did the constitution impact the founding of state-institutions (legislature, government, courts, etc.) ? Does the constitution still infl uence the subsequent constitutional development and even contemporary constitutional design and practice ? If yes, how is this ?
Contributors presented their chapters in the two-day workshop held in Singapore by the Centre for Asian Legal Studies at the National University of Singapore Faculty of Law on 9 and 10 November 2017. Following the workshop, the country rapporteurs were invited to revise their papers in light of the comments received.
It is not our intention to summarise the country studies in this introduction but rather to address common themes in the Southeast Asian experiences of constitutional foundings, and locate these experiences within the general study of constitutional history. We make two claims. First, constitutional history is important to understand constitutional law and constitutionalism, but the study of constitutional history requires us to move beyond looking purely at what courts do and how they interpret Constitutions (juriscentric originalism) and western liberal conceptions of government and constitutionalism. Second, the inquiry into constitutional foundings in the Southeast Asia requires us to consider a range of historical issues, including: the historical conditions and functions of the foundational Constitutions; the historical internal and external factors that infl uence the process and substances of foundational constitutionmaking; and the possible lasting impact of the foundational constitutional values in the subsequent constitutional trajectory. We pursue this dual argument in two parts. Part I addresses the issues regarding the signifi cance of constitutional history and constitutional history studies, while Part II discusses general themes regarding the foundational constitution-making in the region. Part III concludes. 1 
I. THE STUDY OF CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
Why should we be concerned about the fi rst Constitutions in Southeast Asia, most of which were drafted decades ago ? For a start, it is a truism that the development of constitutional law and constitutionalism in the region cannot be detached from history. Thus, it is important for us to study constitutional foundings in Southeast Asia to understand not only constitutional history but also contemporary constitutional development and constitutionalism in the region, especially since they are informed by foundational values embedded through these fi rst constitutions. In fact, the signifi cance of history in constitutional development and constitutionalism has been repeatedly underscored. Long ago, the German philosopher GWF Hegel argued that constitutionalism is the self-determination of identity of a given people, and is an ongoing social and historical process. 1 In the same vein, the Kenyan scholar Okoth-Ogendo posits constitutionalism ' can become a tradition only if it forms part of the shared history of a people. ' 2 Similarly, Michael W Dowdle argues that ' in identifying a political identity, history provides the best source material for constitutionalism ' since it ' is history that distinguishes the collective " people " of one particular terrain from those of another. ' 3 Felix Frankfurter, who served as an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, also considers the US Constitution ' most signifi cantly not a document but a stream of history. ' 4 Unfortunately, while there has been heightened growth in Asian constitutional scholarship in recent years, most scholars tend to focus on contemporary constitutional issues, leaving Asian constitutional history largely understudied. 5 Hart Publishing has published single books on the Constitutions of fi ve Southeast Asian States, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and Vietnam. 6 All these volumes contain very useful historical introductions and contextual study and add richly to our knowledge about constitutional experiences in Southeast Asia. However, this body of literature has three major limitations.
First, these books focus mainly on the individual constitutions of the single countries and lack substantive comparisons or identifying commonalities and differences in constitutional responses to the challenge of founding new States. Second, these books focus more on contemporary constitutional issues than the historical context of making the fi rst Constitutions and their relevance to the trajectory of state-building in the respective countries. Third, this body of literature has yet to cover all the constitutions of Southeast Asia -Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, the Philippines, and East Timor. Beyond the Hart series, there are some books about the Constitutions of these jurisdictions, but they are also country-focused books and substantively lack historical constitutional comparison. 7 This book, therefore, seeks to fi ll the gap in the knowledge about constitutional history in Southeast Asia.
This book also taps into the scholarship associated with the recent revitalisation of the comparative study of constitutional history. A regular forum in this area has been active, 8 to address the lack of study into ' the comparative dimensions of constitutional history. ' 9 Some specialist periodicals in this area have been published regularly. 10 Early comparative writings about constitutional history focused mainly on royal institutions in Europe in the Middle Ages. 11 In addition, RR Palmer ' s book The Age of the Democratic Revolution is identifi ed by the author as:
an attempt at a comparative constitutional history of Western Civilization at the time of the French and American Revolutions; but " constitutional " is to be understood in a broad sense, without much emphasis on formal provisions, and in close connection with the political, social, and intellectual currents and the actual confl icts at the time. In recent years, scholars have produced some signifi cant work in this fi eld, such as one comprehensive study of the history of the German Constitutional Court from a comparative (American) perspective. 13 Justin Collings suggests that to translate ' comparative history ' into ' comparative constitutional history, ' 14 three approaches are possible: (a) ' perspectival histories ' (an author ' s own perspective on a single jurisdiction); (b) ' thematic histories ' (a single theme across jurisdictions); and (c) ' relational histories ' (multiple jurisdictions within a single chronological frame). 15 This book falls within the third of Collings ' categories.
The general inquiry of constitutional history in Southeast Asia is still underdeveloped and thus hampered by two limits. The fi rst is jurisdictional. Studies have focused on single jurisdictions and have always linked back to colonial antecedents. The second is substantial in that few studies have looked beyond how history is used in judicial decision-making. 16 Our modest attempt in this volume in understanding the history of foundational constitution-making in Southeast Asia hopes to add to this scholarship.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDINGS
This historical inquiry into constitutional foundings moves beyond juriscentric originalism: how courts should interpret the constitution according to the understanding of the foundational generation. 17 Rather, this inquiry is broadly concerned with the historical conditions and functions of the foundational Constitutions; the internal and external factors that infl uence the process and substances of foundational constitution-making; and the possible lasting impact of the foundational constitutional values in the country ' s subsequent constitutional trajectory.
A. Conditions and Functions of Constitutional Foundings
A theory of ' constitutional foundationalism ' holds that (a) a Constitution is the culmination of a liberal revolution; (b) this foundational constitution-making is a clean break with the past; and (c) the making of such a Constitution is foundational to the creation of a new democratic constitutional order. 18 The Southeast Asian experiences of constitutional foundings do not resonate with these constitutional foundationalist claims.
To begin with, foundational constitution-making in Southeast Asia is not solely the result of a liberal revolution. The process of decolonisation resulted in various different conditions impacting the foundational moments: revolution (in Vietnam and later Laos); evolution (in Singapore and Malaysia); royal determination (Thailand); and segregation (East Timor). Even when constitutionmaking is the culmination of a revolution, this revolution is not necessarily a liberal one. For example, the making of Vietnam ' s 1946 Constitution was the culmination of a communist revolution that ended French colonialism in Indochina. 19 A related observation is that foundational constitution-making in Southeast Asia is not necessarily a radical repudiation of the past. Many fi rst Constitutions in the region continue the colonial and traditional legacies. The monarchy, for example, was retained in the cases of Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Brunei. 20 The traditional communitarian values continue to inform the fi rst Constitution of Indonesia. 21 In Laos, the citizens ' family duties, the role of Buddhism as the state region, and the institution of King ' s Council are refl ective of the State ' s traditional values. 22 As the making of the foundational constitutions in the region is not the codifi cation of values and achievements of liberal revolutions, they are not necessarily a fundamental framework for the creation of a democratic constitutional order. In fact, no democratic constitutional governments were created following the making of the fi rst constitutions in Southeast Asia although the Philippines might be considered somewhat of an exception here. Instead, different types of constitutional orders were created after the making of the foundational constitutions in the region.
Few Southeast Asian experiences of constitutional foundings accord with theories of ' constitutional constructivism ' in which constitution-making in transitional contexts is characterised by incremental change as societies move from authoritarian to liberal democratic rule while preserving continuity with its past. 23 are relevant, we do not see the incremental and continuing constitutional evolution culminates in the creation of liberal constitutionalism in Southeast Asia. The functions of the foundational constitutions in Southeast Asia are not to limit governmental powers in the name of individual liberty.
In contrast, in some cases, constitutional foundings are informed by communitarian constitutional values that are explicitly averse to liberal constitutionalism. For example, in Indonesia, the Javanese ' Family Principle ' philosophy was transformed into a national ideology at its founding. The ' Family Principle ' is the very anti-thesis of individualism, which renders the 1945 Constitution a communitarian and authoritarian constitution. The nationalists summoned Nazi doctrine of the totalitarian state, and models of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Nationalist Party government to legitimatise the ' Family Principle ' . 24 On the other hand, the constitutional founding in East Timor drew on international legal and constitutional norms and ideals, 25 an example of what has been termed transnational or international constitutionalism. 26 It is hard to make generalisations about the roles and functions of foundational constitution-making in Southeast Asia, varied and inter-mixed as they are. This is especially so in a colonial context when independence is won in different ways. For sure, new constitutions signal new beginnings and almost all constitutions may be considered to be foundational documents in the sense that they represent a break from the past, at the very least in terms of sovereignty. At the same time, they may be drafted to express nationalistic ideas and ideals and traditional values, and as a symbol and document to unify the nascent State. In many cases, it is a mix of all these functions.
B. Historical Factors in Constitutional Foundings
What historical factors infl uenced the process and substance of constitutionmaking ? As the country studies show, different factors determined the course of constitution-making in each of the Southeast Asian countries. What might usefully be offered by way of analysis is perhaps for us, as comparativists to consider two broad factors: internal and external.
Internal factors inform the way foundational constitution-making is initiated, organised and carried out, and what goes into the Constitution. This kind of neo-functionalist enquiry takes serious account of the historical and political factors of constitutional development. 27 In the case of Southeast Asia, an unavoidable factor -indeed the ' elephant in the room ' -has been the decolonisation process. Except Thailand, the end of colonialism provided the impetus for the making of the fi rst constitutions in Southeast Asia. Another infl uential factor is internecine political struggles. Political struggles among competing forces (eg the ' revolutionary ' and royalist forces in Thailand; the Royal Lao government and the Lao Issara government in Laos; the Vietminh and non-communist forces in Vietnam) drove and shaped the process and substance of foundational constitution-making. 28 Other infl uential internal factors include: socio-economic conditions, intellectual environment, religion, and traditional values. For example, in Vietnam, the famine of 1945, the diversity of intellectuals (Confucianists, communists, western-educated intellectuals, religious leaders, and royalists) and anti-colonialist movements were relevant and signifi cant factors that shaped its constitution-making processes and also the contents of its 1946 Constitution.
External factors include the infl uence of foreign or external players. Among such factors are foreign constitutional advisors, foreign constitutional texts and movements, foreign governments, international law and international or transnational actors, such as the United Nations. In some cases, constitution-making was infl uenced by ideas, values, and institutions of the former colonial powers (eg French infl uences in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam; the American infl uence in the Philippines; and the British infl uence in Singapore and Malaysia). However, external infl uences are not limited to colonial ties. Drafters of Vietnam ' s 1946 Constitution were also infl uenced by English and American constitutionalism. In the case of Thailand, as constitution-making was free from colonial domination, constitution-makers drew inspirations from different constitutional models (including the Soviet, French and Chinese models). 29 Mechanisms of external infl uences on domestic constitution-making include: coercion, competition, learning, and acculturation. 30 Constitution-makers may be coercively infl uenced by their former colonists (eg Laos and Cambodia). Countries may also consciously borrow from foreign constitutional models to modernise the domestic political and legal systems (eg Thailand). 31 Countries may incorporate foreign experiences into their Constitutions to socialise themselves to the ' civilized world ' to gain more international recognition (eg Vietnam). The incentive to adopt transnational constitutional values to compete for foreign investments is less relevant as this is more associated with economic globalisation. 32 Oftentimes, it is a mix of externalities given that constitutional bargains need to be hammered out through negotiations among key political actors of all ideological stripes. Reaction to external infl uences is not always positive. Resistance is common in transnational constitutional interactions. This stems from a range of factors, such as nationalism, the protection of sovereignty, the expressive nature of Constitution, and the fear of western hegemony, 33 such as was the case in Indonesia, whose founders resisted western constitutional ideas and institutions in favour of traditional communitarian values. 34
C. The Legacies of Constitutional Foundings
The legacies of the constitutional foundings have, in some cases, a lasting effect on the subsequent constitutional trajectory of their respective countries. In some cases, the founding constitutional legacies continue to provide the ideas, inspirations for constitutional debates and mobilisation many years after their promulgation. Take the case of Vietnam for example. During the 2013 constitution-making process, many actors called for a return to the values of the 1946 Constitution. These actors included retired political leaders and senior offi cials; incumbent senior offi cials; liberal assembly delegates; distinguished legal scholars, intellectuals in different fi elds; ordinary people; and dissidents. They made their demands utilising various different fora: congressional forum, popular forums (state-owned popular medias, unoffi cial websites, and Facebook), and scholarly forums (national law journals and conferences, workshops, and seminars) and using the fi rst Constitution of 1946 as the platform, they called for a constitutional referendum; a change of the nation ' s name from Socialist Republic of Vietnam to Democratic Republic of Vietnam; a multiparty system; a semi-presidential system of government; judicial independence; and private ownership of lands. 35 Foundational Constitutions may also inform and impact subsequent constitutional design. In Laos, we fi nd some traits of its 1947/1949 Constitution in that of its socialist Constitution of 1991. For example, the name of its national legislature (National Assembly) is retained as well as the institution of vote of no confi dence, which is most unusual in a communist state. 36 In Cambodia, despites radical differences, ' many traits of the 1947 Constitution can be found among the provisions of the 1993 Constitution. These include the restoration of 37 See chapter on Cambodia. 38 an elective mechanism for choosing the King; the establishment of a Supreme Council of Magistracy; and the principles for elections and functioning of the Senate, when it was reintroduced by a constitutional amendment in 1998. 37 The attachment to the founding constitutional legacies in constitutional debate, mobilisation, and design in Southeast Asia echoes Schepelle ' s observation that:
Constitutions in their moments of creation cannot be inspired solely b y imagined futures. Perhaps even more crucially, they encode imagined pasts. Though they may look abroad for models, constitution drafters ultimately understand and react most of all to what they take to be the crucial histories of their own countries. 38 Reference back to the founding constitutional legacies may also be instrumental in gaining more legitimacy and social support for new constitutional designs as societies often prefer continuity to change. This may be done even if past constitutional experiences prove fl awed, as in the case of Indonesia. In such situations, constitutional actors are not harking back nor clamouring for a particular constitutional form or arrangement, but rather for what might be regarded as ideals, values and other social meanings embedded in the foundational document and the process of its drafting.
III. CONCLUSION
This book makes a fi rst small step towards a Southeast Asian contribution to the general scholarship on constitutional history in two ways. First, the inquiry into constitutional history is not necessarily associated with judicial institutions and constitutional adjudication. We believe that it is necessary to expand the scope of constitutional history studies to the study of the history of constitution-building generally. Secondly, as many of our case studies show, constitution-making in post-colonial conditions brought into play many other political and social factors, not least of which was the need for the nascent country to build both a State and a nation. The Constitution could be used to galvanise the disparate peoples of the new State but also to organise government in a way that would give the State enough authority and capacity to govern.
We end with a word of acknowledgement. Thanks to the Centre for Asian Legal Studies at the Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore, for supporting this project and to the scholars who generously contributed to the workshop and to this volume. Last but not least, we thank Hart Publishing for its continuing support of our efforts to contribute usefully to the study of Constitutionalism in Asia.
